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Satisficing in sales competition: experimental evidence

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  • Siegfried Berninghaus
  • Werner Güth
  • M. Vittoria Levati
  • Jianying Qiu

Abstract

In a stochastic duopoly market, sellers must form state-specific aspirations expressing how much they want to earn given their expectations about the other's behavior. We define individually and mutually satisficing sales behavior for given individual beliefs and aspiration profiles. In a first experimental phase, whenever satis¯cing is not possible, beliefs or aspirations have to be adapted, or other strategy profiles must be found. In a second phase, participants are free to select non-satisficing sales profiles. The results reveal that most people are satisficers who, either mandatorily or deliberately, tend to adjust aspiration levels if they cannot be satisfied.

Suggested Citation

  • Siegfried Berninghaus & Werner Güth & M. Vittoria Levati & Jianying Qiu, 2006. "Satisficing in sales competition: experimental evidence," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-32, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
    • Handle: RePEc:esi:discus:2006-32
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    Cited by:

    1. Mariana Blanco & Dirk Engelmann & Alexander Koch & Hans-Theo Normann, 2010. "Belief elicitation in experiments: is there a hedging problem?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 13(4), pages 412-438, December.
    2. Güth, Werner & Vittoria Levati, M. & Ploner, Matteo, 2010. "Satisficing in strategic environments: A theoretical approach and experimental evidence," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 39(5), pages 554-561, October.
    3. Werner Güth, 2009. "Optimal gelaufen, einfach zufrieden oder unüberlegt gehandelt? Zur Theorie (un)eingeschränkt rationalen Entscheidens," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 10(s1), pages 75-100, May.
    4. Werner Güth, 2007. "A Non-Bayesian Approach to (Un)Bounded Rationality," Jena Economics Research Papers 2007-035, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Satisficing behavior; bounded rationality; duopoly;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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