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Bounded Rationality and Theory Absorption

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Author Info
Werner Güth () (Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems, Jena)
Hartmut Kliemt () (Dept. of Philosophy, University of Duisburg-Essen, Duisburg, Germany)

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Abstract

In plausible theories of bounded rationality actors are not stimulus-response machines but human beings. As such they are guided by theories that predict the course of the world and prescribe how they should try to intervene in that course. Since boundedly rational human beings cannot only observe but can also modify their theories, in particular if they are not satis?ed with the results, a self-application of concepts of boundedly rational behaviour to theory choice and an inquiry of theory absorption seems natural. The paper explores by means of speci?c examples some issues that are raised by combining the concept of satisficing behaviour with that of theory absorption.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Institute of SocioEconomics in its journal Homo Oeconomicus.

Volume (Year): 21 (2004)
Issue (Month): ()
Pages: 521-541
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Handle: RePEc:hom:homoec:v:21:y:2004:p:521-541

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  1. Andrea Morone & Serena Sandri & Tobias Uske, 2007. "On the absorbability of the Guessing Game Theory. A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis," series 0017, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche - Università di Bari, revised Apr 2007. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Werner Güth & M. Vittoria Levati & Matteo Ploner, 2006. "Is Satisficing Absorbable? - An Experimental Study," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-10, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
  3. Werner Güth, 2006. "Satisficing in Portfolio Selection - Theoretical Aspects and Experimental Tests," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-16, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-13.


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