Werner Güth (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Jena, Germany) M. Vittoria Levatia () (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Jena, Germany) Matteo Ploner (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Jena, Germany; University of Trento, Italy)
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
On a heterogeneous experimental oligopoly market, sellers choose a price, specify a set-valued prior-free conjecture about the others' behavior, and form their own profit-aspiration for each element of their conjecture. We formally define the concepts of satisficing and prior-free optimality and check if seller participants behave in accordance with them. We find that seller participants are satisficers, but fail to be "prior-free" optimal.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics, Thueringer Universitaets- und Landesbibliothek in its series Jena Economic Research Papers in Economics with number
2008-067.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: