Why Do Some Motorbike Riders Wear a Helmet and Others Don't? Evidence from Delhi, India
AbstractWe focus on helmet use behavior among motorbike users in Delhi. We use a detailed data set collected for the purpose of the study. To guide our empirical analysis, we rely on a simple model in which drivers decide on self-protection and self-insurance. The empirical findings suggest that risk averse drivers are more likely to wear a helmet, there is no systematic effect on speed. Helmet use also increases with education. Drivers who show a higher awareness of road risks are both more likely to wear a helmet and to speed less. Controlling for risk awareness, we observe that drivers tend to compensate between speed and helmet use. The results can provide a basis for awareness-raising policies. Improvements to the road infrastructure bear the risk of leading to risk-compensating behavior.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 8042.
Length: 48 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2014
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General
- I10 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - General
- I15 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health and Economic Development
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- R41 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Transportation: Demand, Supply, and Congestion
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2014-03-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-HEA-2014-03-30 (Health Economics)
- NEP-IAS-2014-03-30 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-TRE-2014-03-30 (Transport Economics)
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