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Mandatory Belt Use and Driver Risk Taking

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  • Adrian K. Lund
  • Paul Zador

Abstract

A study of driver behavior before and after a mandatory seat belt use law in Newfoundland found that the benefits of such legislation are not reduced by riskier driving, as has been suggested by some theorists. On average, belt use in Newfoundland increased from 16% of drivers before the law to 77% after the law. At the same time, the quality of driving changed very little when compared to control groups of Nova Scotia drivers, who were not subject to the law and whose belt use rates did not change. In only one situation did Newfoundland drivers differ from the control group in Nova Scotia: after the belt law, drivers in Newfoundland became relatively more cautious (slower) in their speeds on four‐lane expressways. These data confirm the results of earlier less controlled studies that also found no changes in driving behavior following nonvoluntary changes in occupant protection. Since the “risk‐compensation” hypothesis predicts such changes, it seems to have no merit in explaining changes in fatalities and injuries after occupant protection legislation.

Suggested Citation

  • Adrian K. Lund & Paul Zador, 1984. "Mandatory Belt Use and Driver Risk Taking," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 4(1), pages 41-53, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:riskan:v:4:y:1984:i:1:p:41-53
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1539-6924.1984.tb00130.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lindgren, Bjorn & Stuart, Charles, 1980. "The Effects of Traffic Safety Regulation in Sweden," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 412-427, April.
    2. Peltzman, Sam, 1975. "The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 677-725, August.
    3. Robertson, L.S., 1981. "Automobile safety regulations and death reductions in the United States," American Journal of Public Health, American Public Health Association, vol. 71(8), pages 818-822.
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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Grimm & Carole Treibich, 2013. "Why Do Some Bikers Wear a Helmet and Others Don't? Evidence from Delhi, India," AMSE Working Papers 1348, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, revised 10 Oct 2013.
    2. Dorothy Robyn & Katherine Swartz, 1993. "Insights," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 12(2), pages 359-363.
    3. Eric A. Latimer, 1992. "Effects of Increased Auto Safety Belt Use Levels on Fatalities," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 12(3), pages 449-454, September.
    4. Grimm, Michael & Treibich, Carole, 2016. "Why do some motorbike riders wear a helmet and others don’t? Evidence from Delhi, India," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 318-336.
    5. Theodor D. Sterling & James J. Weinkam, 1987. "Errors in Estimates of Smoking‐Related Deaths Derived from Nonsmoker Mortality," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 7(4), pages 463-475, December.

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