Training Background and Early Retirement
AbstractSeveral studies show that employees with firm-specific skills are more likely to be covered by employer-sponsored pension schemes than workers with general skills. Therefore it can be expected that workers with firm-specific skills retire earlier. This paper tests this prediction using US data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Older Men. We find that workers who participated in firm-specific training in their early careers retire earlier than workers with a general training background. This indicates that shared investments in firm-specific training are embedded in implicit contracts that induce early retirement. The results remain robust when controlling for technological change and work commitment.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 3504.
Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: May 2008
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as 'Training and retirement patterns' in: Applied Economics, 2013, 45 (15), 1991-1999
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J14 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of the Elderly; Economics of the Handicapped; Non-Labor Market Discrimination
- J26 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Retirement; Retirement Policies
- J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGE-2008-07-14 (Economics of Ageing)
- NEP-ALL-2008-07-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-HRM-2008-07-14 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-LAB-2008-07-14 (Labour Economics)
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