This paper develops a partial equilibrium model to account for stylized facts about the behavior of oligarchs, politically and economically strong conglomerates in transition and developing countries. The model predicts that oligarchs are more likely than other owners to invest in productivity enhancing projects and to vertically integrate firms to capture the gains from possible synergies and, thus, oligarchs can be productive. Using a unique dataset comprising almost 2,000 Ukrainian open joint stock companies, the paper tests empirical implications of the model. In contrast to commonly held views, econometric results suggest that, after controlling for endogeneity of ownership, oligarchs can improve the performance of the firms they own relative to other firms.
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Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number
3282.
Length: 2008 pages Date of creation: Jan 2008 Date of revision: Publication status: published in: Journal of Comparative Economics, 2008, 36 (1), 17-42 Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3282
Find related papers by JEL classification: C21 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models C25 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models D24 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Production; Capital and Total Factor Productivity; Capacity O17 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements P26 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Political Economy P31 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions
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Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1999.
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