Political patronage in Ukranian banking
AbstractThis paper empirically investigates the link between political patronage and bank performance for Ukraine during 2003Q3-2005Q2. We find significant differences between politically affiliated and non-affiliated banks. The data suggest that affiliated banks have significantly lower interest margins. The gap between affiliated banks' and non-affiliated banks' capitalization ratios, is narrowing over time. Parliamentary deputies might use financial institutions to achieve political goals which reduces their banks' performance.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Boston College Department of Economics in its series Boston College Working Papers in Economics with number 657.
Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: 14 Feb 2007
Date of revision: 13 Feb 2008
Publication status: published, Economics of Transition, 16(3), 2008, 537-557; earlier version published (in German) as "Ukrainische Banken: Politische Patronage von Bedeutung", Wochenbericht Nr. 23/2007, DIW Berlin, pp. 367-371.
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Postal: Boston College, 140 Commonwealth Avenue, Chestnut Hill MA 02467 USA
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More information through EDIRC
Political patronage; Ukraine; banking;
Other versions of this item:
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-02-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2007-02-24 (Banking)
- NEP-CFN-2007-02-24 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-CWA-2007-02-24 (Central & Western Asia)
- NEP-EFF-2007-02-24 (Efficiency & Productivity)
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