Bargaining at Divorce: The Allocation of Custody
AbstractWe model the bargaining process of parents over custody at the time of divorce. First we assume an institutional setting where only sole custody is available. In a second step we reform this institutional setting and introduce the possibility of joint custody. We show that some parents, who would not be able to find an agreement in a sole custody regime, can find an agreement after the joint custody reform. Accordingly, our empirical analysis shows that the introduction of joint custody enables more parents to divorce by mutual consent.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 2544.
Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2007
Date of revision:
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Other versions of this item:
- J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
- J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
- K36 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Family and Personal Law
- D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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