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Politico-Economic Causes of Labor Regulation in the United States: Rent Seeking, Alliances, Raising Rivals' Costs (Even Lowering One's Own?), and Interjurisdictional Competition

Author

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  • Addison, John T.

    (Durham University Business School)

Abstract

This paper offers an eclectic survey of the political economy of labor regulation in the United States at federal and state levels along the dimensions of occupational health and safety, unjust dismissal, right-to-work, workplace safety and workers’ compensation, living wages, and prevailing wages. We discuss rent seeking/predation, coalition formation, judicial review, and interjurisdictional competition as well as the implications of union decline. Our analysis should help dispel any notion that the U.S. labor market is unregulated while also indicating that the political process shows some sensitivity to benefits and costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Addison, John T., 2006. "Politico-Economic Causes of Labor Regulation in the United States: Rent Seeking, Alliances, Raising Rivals' Costs (Even Lowering One's Own?), and Interjurisdictional Competition," IZA Discussion Papers 2381, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2381
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Roland Vaubel, 2008. "The political economy of labor market regulation by the European Union," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 3(4), pages 435-465, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    judicial review; prevailing wages; living wage ordinances; labor regulation; right-to-work; workplace safety; unjust dismissals; OSHA; interjurisdictional competition; regulatory capture; unionism.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
    • J28 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Safety; Job Satisfaction; Related Public Policy
    • J38 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Public Policy
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • J48 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Particular Labor Markets; Public Policy
    • J58 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Public Policy
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
    • J80 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Standards - - - General
    • K31 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Labor Law

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