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Identity, Communication, and Conflict: An Experiment

Author

Listed:
  • Bhaumik, Sumon K.

    (University of Sheffield)

  • Chowdhury, Subhasish M.

    (University of Sheffield)

  • Dimova, Ralitza

    (University of Manchester)

  • Fromell, Hanna

    (Aarhus University)

Abstract

We investigate experimentally the effects of information about native/immigrant identity, and the ability to communicate a self-chosen personal characteristic towards the rival on conflict behavior. In a two-player individual contest with British and Immigrant subjects in the UK we find that neither information about identity nor communicating self-characteristics significantly affect the average level of conflict. Both of those, however, significantly affect players' strategies, in the sense of the extent they involve conflict over time. Overall, the results indicate that inter-personal communication may help to mitigate high intensity conflicts when the identities are common knowledge among rivals.

Suggested Citation

  • Bhaumik, Sumon K. & Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Dimova, Ralitza & Fromell, Hanna, 2023. "Identity, Communication, and Conflict: An Experiment," IZA Discussion Papers 16020, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp16020
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    conflict; experiment; identity; immigrant; communication;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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