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The long-run effects of communication as a conflict resolution mechanism

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  • Eisenkopf, Gerald

Abstract

The paper studies an experimental conflict in a repeated game and tests the robustness of communication as an intermediate conflict resolution instrument. The results show a strong and persistent impact of communication. Most conflict parties refrain from conflict expenditures even after the opportunity for communication has expired. Third party involvement with punishment options does not enhance this effect while contesting one prize rather than multiple prizes reduces it. Conflict resolution is less successful even in the long term if initial conflict intensity is rather high.

Suggested Citation

  • Eisenkopf, Gerald, 2018. "The long-run effects of communication as a conflict resolution mechanism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 121-136.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:154:y:2018:i:c:p:121-136
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.08.002
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    3. Bershadskyy, Dmitri & Sachs, Florian E. & Weimann, Joachim, 2023. "Collective bargaining in a shrinking group game: The role of information and communication," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 209(C), pages 391-410.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Conflict resolution; Experiment; Communication; Social preferences;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • F5 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy
    • H8 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues

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