Parochial altruism in inter-group conflicts
AbstractWe investigate parochial altruism, the combination of in-group altruism and out-group hostility, in an experimental conflict game preceded by a prisoner’s dilemma. Our data are consistent with parochial altruism, but cannot be explained by in-group pro-sociality or out-group hostility alone.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 117 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Parochial altruism; Conflict; Experiments;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
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