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Can Public Discussion Enhance Program Ownership?

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  • Mr. Peter Isard
  • Allan Drazen

Abstract

We use the concepts of deliberative democracy from political science and cheap talk from economics to develop a better understanding of how public discussion can contribute to building and demonstrating ownership of IMF programs and hence to program success. We argue that ownership is more complex than many discussions of it would suggest, since it must include not only the willingness to carry out a program, but also the technical capacity and especially the political ability to do so. Public discussion can serve a number of purposes, each of which can be better understood by moving to a more formal treatment. We illustrate our points by means of simple examples. We also consider some of the drawbacks of public discussion, especially as applied to IMF programs.

Suggested Citation

  • Mr. Peter Isard & Allan Drazen, 2004. "Can Public Discussion Enhance Program Ownership?," IMF Working Papers 2004/163, International Monetary Fund.
    • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2004/163
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Armenia ANDRONICEANU & Gurgen OHANYAN, 2015. "Cooperation between European Governments and the IMF: Conditionality Impact on Employment within the EU," REVISTA DE MANAGEMENT COMPARAT INTERNATIONAL/REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE MANAGEMENT, Faculty of Management, Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania, vol. 16(3), pages 324-334, July.
    2. Marchesi, Silvia & Sabani, Laura & Dreher, Axel, 2011. "Read my lips: The role of information transmission in multilateral reform design," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 86-98, May.
    3. Silvia Marchesi & Laura Sabani & Axel Dreher, 2009. "Agency and communicaton in IMF conditional lending: Theory and empirical evidence," KOF Working papers 09-218, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
    4. Graham Bird, 2007. "The Imf: A Bird'S Eye View Of Its Role And Operations," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(4), pages 683-745, September.
    5. Silva Marchesi & Laura Sabani & Axel Dreher, 2009. "Agency and communication in IMF conditional lending: theory and empirical evidence," Ibero America Institute for Econ. Research (IAI) Discussion Papers 183, Ibero-America Institute for Economic Research.
    6. Martin S. Edwards, 2009. "Public support for the international economic organizations: Evidence from developing countries," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 185-209, June.
    7. Bernhard Reinsberg & Thomas Stubbs & Alexander Kentikelenis, 2022. "Compliance, defiance, and the dependency trap: International Monetary Fund program interruptions and their impact on capital markets," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 16(4), pages 1022-1041, October.
    8. Marek Dabrowski & Artur Radziwill, 2007. "Regional vs. Global Public Goods: The Case of Post-Communist Transition," CASE Network Studies and Analyses 0336, CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research.
    9. Shinji Takagi, 2010. "Applying the Lessons of Asia: The IMF’s Crisis Management Strategy in 2008," Working Papers id:3006, eSocialSciences.
    10. Oscar Calvo-Gonzalez, 2007. "Ownership and conditionality in IMF-supported programs: Back to Per Jacobsson’s time," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 2(4), pages 329-343, December.
    11. Shinji Takagi, 2010. "Applying the Lessons of Asia : The IMF’s Crisis Management Strategy in 2008," Macroeconomics Working Papers 22822, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
    12. Accetturo, Antonio & de Blasio, Guido, 2012. "Policies for local development: An evaluation of Italy's “Patti Territoriali”," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1-2), pages 15-26.
    13. Carsten Hefeker, 2006. "Project Aid or Budget Aid? The Interests of Governments and Financial Institutions," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(2), pages 241-252, May.
    14. Martin Edwards, 2009. "Public support for the international economic organizations: Evidence from developing countries," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 185-209, June.
    15. repec:got:cegedp:86 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Artur Radziwill & Pawel Smietanka, 2009. "EU's Eastern Neighbours: Institutional Harmonisation and Potential Growth Bonus," CASE Network Studies and Analyses 0386, CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research.

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