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Agency and communication in IMF conditional lending: theory and empirical evidence

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  • Silva Marchesi

    (Università di Milano Bicocca / Italy)

  • Laura Sabani

    (Università di Firenze / Italy)

  • Axel Dreher

    ()
    (University of Goettingen / Germany)

Abstract

We focus on the role that the transmission of information between a multilateral (the IMF) and a country has for the optimal design of conditional reforms. Our model predicts that when agency problems are especially severe, and/or IMF information is valuable, a centralized control is indeed optimal. To the contrary, when local knowledge is more important than the agency bias we expect delegation to dominate. Controlling for economic and political factors, our empirical tests show that the number of IMF conditions is lower in countries with a greater social complexity, while it increases with the bias of the countries’ authorities, openness, and transparency, consistently with the theory.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Ibero-America Institute for Economic Research in its series Ibero America Institute for Econ. Research (IAI) Discussion Papers with number 183.

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Length: 43 pages
Date of creation: 10 Mar 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:got:iaidps:183

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Keywords: IMF conditionality; delegation; communication; panel data;

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