Chasing Patents

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Chasing Patents

Author Info

Flavio Menzies
Rohan Pitchford

Abstract

We examine the problem faced by a company that wishes to purchase patents in the hands of two di¤erent patent owners. Complementarity of these patents in the production process of the company is a prime e¢ciency reason for them being owned (or licenced) by the company. We show that this very same complementarity can lead to patent owners behaving strategically in bargaining, and delaying their sale to the company. When the company is highly leveraged, such ine¢cient delay is limited. Comparative statics results are also obtained.

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Paper provided by International and Development Economics in its series International and Development Economics Working Papers with number idec02-3.

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Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: 2002
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Handle: RePEc:idc:wpaper:idec02-3

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
L59 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Other

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2004-12-12 (All new papers)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-58, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1988. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Working papers 495, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1980. "Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 42-64, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
O'Flaherty, Brendan, 1994. "Land assembly and urban renewal," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 287-300, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Kenneth Arrow, 1962. "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention," NBER Chapters, in: The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, pages 609-626 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
Kamien, Morton I., 1992. "Patent licensing," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 331-354 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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