Why Do Populist-Outsiders Get Elected? A Model of Strategic Populists
AbstractThe existence of populist regimes led by outsiders is not new in history. In this paper a simple framework is presented that shows how and why a populist outsider can be elected to office, and under what conditions he is more likely to be elected. The results show that countries with a higher income and wealth concentration are more likely to elect populist outsiders than countries where income and wealth are more equally distributed. It is also shown that elections with a runoff are less likely to bring these populist outsiders into office.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department in its series Research Department Publications with number 4716.
Date of creation: May 2011
Date of revision:
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-08-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2011-08-29 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2011-08-29 (Positive Political Economics)
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