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What It Takes to Be a Leader: Leadership and Charisma in a Citizen-Candidate Model

Author

Listed:
  • Binyamin Berdugo

    (BGU)

Abstract

This paper analyses leadership and charisma within the framework of social choice. In societies that lack formal institutional authorities, the power of leaders to coerce is limited. Under such conditions we find that social outcomes will depend not only on policy preferences but also on individuals' abilities to transform voluntary efforts into some communal public good. The paper has three central results: (1) Leaders might credibly compromise on policies they favor in order to elicit more social efforts, while society members might be willing to compromise on favorable policies in order to gain better leaders. (2) Under imperfect information regarding individuals' abilities, social choice might be biased toward less competent but more charismatic leaders. (3) Lesscompetent, more charismatic leaders can achieve more in terms of social goals than competent non-charismatic ones.

Suggested Citation

  • Binyamin Berdugo, 2006. "What It Takes to Be a Leader: Leadership and Charisma in a Citizen-Candidate Model," Working Papers 0612, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:bgu:wpaper:0612
    as

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    File URL: http://in.bgu.ac.il/en/humsos/Econ/Workingpapers/0612.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alesina, Alberto & Spear, Stephen E., 1988. "An overlapping generations model of electoral competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 359-379, December.
    2. Hermalin, Benjamin E, 1998. "Toward an Economic Theory of Leadership: Leading by Example," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1188-1206, December.
    3. Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114.
    4. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
    5. Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 2001. "Lobbying and Welfare in a Representative Democracy," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 68(1), pages 67-82.
    6. Alesina, Alberto, 1988. "Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-Party System with Rational Voters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 796-805, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Sebastian Miller, 2011. "Why Do Populist-Outsiders Get Elected? A Model of Strategic Populists," Research Department Publications 4716, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Leadership; Charisma; Electoral Competition; Candidates;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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