This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

The Causes of Slavery or Serfdom and the Roads to Agrarian Capitalism: Domar's Hypothesis Revisited

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Jonathan Conning () (Hunter College, Department of Economics)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

I propose a simple general equilibrium formalization of Domar's famous hypothesis on the causes of slavery or serfdom that emphasizes the interactions between factor endowments, the nature of the production technologies, and the initial distribution of property rights over land. The model provides a framework within which to understand the choice between slavery, serfdom, and free labor and tenancy equilibria with or without bonded labor-service obligations. The model also sheds light on the `Agrarian Question' regarding why some otherwise similar regions transitioned to free-labor agrarian capitalism via an `American road' dominated by independent family farms while others followed a `Junker road' with production dominated by large estates surrounded by small semi-proletarianized peasant households. The model is built around an otherwise canonical general equilibrium trade model adapted to allow for the endogenous emergence of land oligopoly and labor oligopsony power distortions that shape the pattern of agrarian production organization.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://arrow.hunter.cuny.edu/research/papers/HunterEconWP401.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Hunter College: Department of Economics in its series Hunter College Department of Economics Working Papers with number 401.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:htr:hcecon:401

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 695 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10065
Phone: 212-772-5400
Fax: 212-772-5398
Web page: http://econ.hunter.cuny.edu
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Jonathan Conning).

Related research
Keywords: Monoposony; agrarian organization; inequality; tenancy; slavery; serfdom.;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
J42 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Monopsony; Segmented Labor Markets
J43 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Agricultural Labor Markets
L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
Q12 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets
Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation
F11 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Neoclassical Models of Trade

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Sadoulet, Elisabeth, 1992. "Labor-Service Tenancy Contracts in a Latin American Context," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 1031-42, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Feenstra, Robert C., 1980. "Monopsony distortions in an open economy: A theoretical analysis," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 213-235, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Genicot, Garance, 2002. "Bonded labor and serfdom: a paradox of voluntary choice," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 101-127, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Deininger, Klaus & Binswanger, Hans P, 1995. "Rent Seeking and the Development of Large-Scale Agriculture in Kenya, South Africa, and Zimbabwe," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(3), pages 493-522, April.
  5. Roemer, John E, 1982. "Origins of Exploitation and Class: Value Theory of Pre-Capitalist Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 163-92, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Chwe, Michael Suk-Young, 1990. "Why Were Workers Whipped? Pain in a Principal-Agent Model," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(403), pages 1109-21, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Kenneth L. Sokoloff & Stanley L. Engerman, 2000. "Institutions, Factor Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 217-232, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Bhaduri, Amit, 1973. "A Study in Agricultural Backwardness under Semi-Feudalism," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 83(329), pages 120-37, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Bergstrom, T, 1971. "On the Existence and Optimality of Competitive Equilibrium for a Slave Economy," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(113), pages 23-36, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Findlay, Ronald, 1975. "Slavery, Incentives, and Manumission: A Theoretical Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(5), pages 923-33, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Robert J. Thornton, 2004. "Retrospectives: How Joan Robinson and B. L. Hallward Named Monopsony," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(2), pages 257-261, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Binswanger, Hans P. & Deininger, Klaus & Feder, Gershon, 1995. "Power, distortions, revolt and reform in agricultural land relations," Handbook of Development Economics, in: Hollis Chenery† & T.N. Srinivasan (ed.), Handbook of Development Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 42, pages 2659-2772 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  13. James R. Markusen & Arthur J. Robson, 1980. "Simple General Equilibrium and Trade with a Monopsonized Sector," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 13(4), pages 668-82, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Jonathan Conning & Michael Kevane, 2005. "Freedom, Servitude and Voluntary Contract," Hunter College Department of Economics Working Papers 408, Hunter College: Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You too can volunteer for RePEc, for example by encouraging others to use our services.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-11.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.