Slavery, Incentives, and Manumission: A Theoretical Model
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 83 (1975)
Issue (Month): 5 (October)
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Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE/
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- Howard Bodenhorn, 2011.
"Manumission in nineteenth-century Virginia,"
Cliometrica, Journal of Historical Economics and Econometric History,
Association Française de Cliométrie (AFC), vol. 5(2), pages 145-164, June.
- Mark Yanochik & Bradley Ewing & Mark Thornton, 2001. "A new perspective on antebellum slavery: Public policy and slave prices," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 29(3), pages 330-340, September.
- Bernd Beber & Christopher Blattman, 2010. "The Industrial Organization of Rebellion: The Logic of Forced Labor and Child Soldiering," HiCN Working Papers 72, Households in Conflict Network.
- Jonathan Conning, 2004. "The Causes of Slavery or Serfdom and the Roads to Agrarian Capitalism: Domar's Hypothesis Revisited," Hunter College Department of Economics Working Papers 401, Hunter College: Department of Economics.
- Haluk I. Ergin & Serdar Sayan, 1997.
"A Microeconomic Analysis of Slavery in Comparison to Free Labor Economies,"
- Haluk Ergin & Serdar Sayan, 1997. "A Microeconomic Analysis of Slavery in Comparison to Free Labor Economies," Departmental Working Papers 978, Bilkent University, Department of Economics.
- Michael Suk-Young Chwe, 1990. "Violence in Incentives: Pain in a Principal-Agent Model," Discussion Papers 871, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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