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Violence in Incentives: Pain in a Principal-Agent Model

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Michael Suk-Young Chwe
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File URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/871.pdf
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Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 871.

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Date of creation: Mar 1990
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Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:871

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  1. Nardinelli, Clark, 1982. "Corporal punishment and children's wages in nineteenth century Britain," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 283-295, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Osband, Kent, 1987. "Speak softly, but carry a big stick: On optimal targets under moral hazard," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 584-595, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Findlay, Ronald, 1975. "Slavery, Incentives, and Manumission: A Theoretical Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(5), pages 923-33, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Barzel, Yoram, 1977. "An Economic Analysis of Slavery," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(1), pages 87-110, April.
  5. Fenoaltea, Stefano, 1984. "Slavery and Supervision in Comparative Perspective: A Model," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 44(03), pages 635-668, September. [Downloadable!]
  6. Bergstrom, T, 1971. "On the Existence and Optimality of Competitive Equilibrium for a Slave Economy," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(113), pages 23-36, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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