Relative efficiencies of antebellum slave farms are suggested by many empirical studies. This paper considers a theoretical aspect of those results using a repeated principal-agent problem. Within its theoretical analysis, with relevance to profitability of slave farms, it will be shown that when inter-temporal punishments are necessary and when they can perform efficiently in production. Applying those theoretical results, some empirical studies on relative profitability and relative efficiencies are discussed. In the empirical study, relative efficiencies of each farm scale—free farms, task farms, and gang farms—are estimated region by region by a stochastic profit frontier model.
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number
181.
Find related papers by JEL classification: N51 - Economic History - - Agriculture, Natural Resources, Environment and Extractive Industries - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913 C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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