Slavery and other property rights
AbstractThe institution of slavery is found mostly at intermediate stages of agricultural development, and less often among hunter-gatherers and advanced agrarian societies. We explain this pattern in a growth model with land and labor as inputs in production, and an endogenously determined property rights institution. The economy endogenously transits from an egalitarian state with equal property rights, to a despotic slave society where the elite own both people and land; thereafter it endogenously transits into a free labor society, where the elite own the land, but people are free.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 372.
Date of creation: May 2003
Date of revision: 30 Aug 2006
Slavery; long-run growth;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E0 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General
- Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
- P51 - Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-11-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-HRM-2006-11-12 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-MAC-2006-11-12 (Macroeconomics)
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