Why Were Workers Whipped? Pain in a Principal-Agent Model
AbstractOne reason a person hurts another is to get that person to do something. This paper uses a model to show that threatening pain can be rational and that pain is inflicted upon people who are poor in the sense of having bad alternatives. The model corrects a confusion in previous models of slavery; gives an explanation of why child, and not adult, laborers were beaten during the industrial revolution; and prompts a discussion of the dangers of rational-choice modeling. Copyright 1990 by Royal Economic Society.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 100 (1990)
Issue (Month): 403 (December)
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