Creditor-Focused Corporate Governance: Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions in Japan
AbstractMergers in Japan have the dubious distinction of not creating wealth for shareholders of target firms, in sharp contrast to much of the rest of the world. Using a sample of 91 mergers from 1982 through 2003 we document several distinctive features of the merger market in Japan: mergers tend to be countercyclical and often orchestrated by a common main bank. Overall our results point to a market for corporate control that is distinctly less shareholder-focused than that in the U.S., and one where creditors play an important, perhaps dominant, role in corporate governance.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University in its series CEI Working Paper Series with number 2009-01.
Length: 33 p.
Date of creation: Aug 2009
Date of revision:
Japanese mergers; Japanese corporate governance;
Other versions of this item:
- Mehrotra, Vikas & van Schaik, Dimitri & Spronk, Jaap & Steenbeek, Onno, 2011. "Creditor-Focused Corporate Governance: Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions in Japan," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(04), pages 1051-1072, September.
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-11-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2009-11-21 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CFN-2009-11-21 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-COM-2009-11-21 (Industrial Competition)
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