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The fetters of the sib: Weber meets Darwin

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  • Ingela Alger

    (Carleton University - Department of Economics)

  • Jörgen Weibull

    (SSE - Department of Economics - Stockholm School of Economics, Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7176 - Polytechnique - X)

Abstract

We analyze how family ties affect incentives, with focus on the strategic interaction between a pair of mutually altruistic siblings. Each sibling exerts effort to produce output under uncertainty and the siblings may transfer output to each other. With equally altruistic siblings, their equilibrium effort is nonmonotonic in the common degree of altruism and depends on the harshness of the environment. We define a notion of local evolutionary robustness of degrees of sibling altruism, and show that this degree is less than one half, the kinship relatedness factor. By way of numerical simulations we show that family ties are weaker in harsher environments.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number hal-00354241.

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Date of creation: Sep 2008
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00354241

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Keywords: altruism; family ties; Hamilton's rule; free-riding; evolutionary robustness;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Ingela Alger & Jörgen W. Weibul, 2007. "Kinship, Incentives and Evolution – revised version: Kinship, Incentives, and Evolution," Carleton Economic Papers 07-13, Carleton University, Department of Economics, revised 17 Sep 2010.
  2. Ingela Alger & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2007. "Family ties, incentives and development: A model of coerced altruism," Carleton Economic Papers 07-10, Carleton University, Department of Economics, revised 2008.
  3. Ingela Alger & Jörgen Weibull, 2009. "Kinship, Incentives and Evolution," Working Papers hal-00435431, HAL.
  4. Ingela Alger & Jörgen Weibull, 2008. "The fetters of the sib: Weber meets Darwin," Working Papers hal-00354241, HAL.

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