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On moral hazard in general equilibrium theory

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Helpman, Elhanan
Laffont, Jean-Jacques

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 10 (1975)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 8-23
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:10:y:1975:i:1:p:8-23

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  2. Alessandro, CITANNA & Archishman, CHAKRABORTY, 1999. "Moral Hazard, Aggregate Risk and Nominal Linear Financial Contracts," Les Cahiers de Recherche 683, Groupe HEC. [Downloadable!]
  3. CITANNA, Alessandro, 2000. "Competitive Equilibrium with Moral Hazard in Economies with Multiple Commodities," Les Cahiers de Recherche 700, Groupe HEC. [Downloadable!]
  4. Luca, PANACCIONE, 2006. "Inefficiency of competitive equilibrium with hidden action and financial markets," Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques Working Paper 2006049, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques. [Downloadable!]
  5. CITANNA, Alessandro & CHAKRABORTY, Archishman, 2002. "Occupational Choice, Incentives and Wealth Redistributions with Scarcity of Capital," Les Cahiers de Recherche 788, Groupe HEC. [Downloadable!]
  6. Alger, Ingela & Weibull, Jörgen, 2007. "Family ties, incentives and development: a model of coerced altruism," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 681, Stockholm School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Pradeep Dubey & John Geanakoplos & Martin Shubik, 2001. "Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1304, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Xiaokai Yang, 2000. "Incomplete Contingent Labor Contract, Asymmetric Residual Rights and Authority, and the Theory of the Firm," CID Working Papers 45, Center for International Development at Harvard University. [Downloadable!]
  9. Alberto Bisin & Piero Gottardi, 2003. "Competitive Markets for Non-Exclusive Contracts with Adverse Selection: the Role of Entry Fees," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 6(2), pages 313-338, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Luca Panaccione, 2007. "Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Moral Hazard and Financial Markets," Topics in Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 7(1), pages 1358-1358. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. CITANNA, Alessandro, 2000. "Moral hazard and linear contracts : Economies with idiosyncratic risks," Les Cahiers de Recherche 699, Groupe HEC. [Downloadable!]
  12. CITANNA, Alessandro & CHAKRABORTY, Archishman, 2001. "Occupational Choice, incentives and wealth distribution," Les Cahiers de Recherche 720, Groupe HEC. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Richard Arnott & Chong-en Bai & Brian Sack, 1996. "Latent Policies: An Extended Example," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 353., Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  14. Eric Maskin, 2004. "Jean-Jacques Laffont: A Look Back," Economics Working Papers 0043, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
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