The Sales of Small firms : a multidimensional analysis
AbstractThis paper endogeneizes the security voting structure in an auction mechanism used to sell a small firm. The design of security voting structure allows the seller to choose between two objectives which are not mutually consistent. If the seller wants to maximize his revenue, he should retain some shares to benefit from the future dividends generated by the acquirer. At the opposite, if he wants to sell his firm to the most efficient candidate, he should sell all the shares.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-00179998.
Date of creation: 2001
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Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00179998/en/
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auctions; security voting structure; small firms;
Other versions of this item:
- Christian At & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2003. "The sale of small firms: a multidimensional analysis," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 927-933, November.
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- Grundström, Christina & Öberg, Christina & Öhrwall Rönnbäck, Anna, 2012. "Family-owned manufacturing SMEs and innovativeness: A comparison between within-family successions and external takeovers," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 162-173.
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