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Earned Wealth, Engaged Bidders? Evidence from a second price auction

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Author Info

  • Nicolas Jacquemet

    ()
    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris)

  • Stephane Luchini

    ()
    (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales [EHESS] - CNRS : UMR6579)

  • Robert-Vincent Joule

    ()
    (LPS-AIX - Laboratoire de Psychologie Sociale - Université de Provence - Aix-Marseille I : EA849)

  • Jason Shogren

    ()
    (Departement Economy and Finance, University of Wyoming - University of Wyoming)

Abstract

Recent work in experimental economics has explored whether observed behavior depends on whether wealth was windfall or earned. This paper extends this work by considering whether earned wealth ffects bidding behavior in an induced-value second-price auction. We find people bid more sincerely in the auction with earned wealth given monetary incentives; earned wealth did not induce sincere bidding in hypothetical auctions.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) with number halshs-00277283.

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Date of creation: 06 May 2008
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Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00277283

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Related research

Keywords: Auctions; Demand revelation; Experimental valuation; Hypothetical bias; Earned Money;

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References

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  1. Nicolas Jacquemet & Stephane Luchini & Robert-Vincent Joule & Jason Shogren, 2008. "Do French student really bid sincerely?," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00277282, HAL.
  2. Nicolas Jacquemet & Robert-Vincent Joule & Stéphane Luchini & Jason F. Shogren, 2009. "Preference Elicitation under Oath," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 09043, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
  3. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, 03.
  4. Todd L. Cherry & Peter Frykblom & Jason F. Shogren, 2002. "Hardnose the Dictator," Working Papers 02-06, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
  5. Todd L. Cherry & Stephan Kroll & Jason F. Shogren, 2003. "The Impact of Endowment Heterogeneity and Origin on Public Good Contributions: Evidence from the Lab," Working Papers 03-05, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
  6. Richard H. Thaler & Eric J. Johnson, 1990. "Gambling with the House Money and Trying to Break Even: The Effects of Prior Outcomes on Risky Choice," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 36(6), pages 643-660, June.
  7. Greiner, Ben, 2004. "An Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments," MPRA Paper 13513, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Rutstrom, E. Elisabet & Williams, Melonie B., 2000. "Entitlements and fairness:: an experimental study of distributive preferences," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 75-89, September.
  9. Jeremy Clark, 1998. "Fairness in Public Good Provision: An Investigation of Preferences for Equality and Proportionality," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(3), pages 708-729, August.
  10. Jeremy Clark, 2002. "House Money Effects in Public Good Experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 223-231, December.
  11. Nicolas Jacquemet & Stephane Luchini & Robert-Vincent Joule & Jason Shogren, 2008. "Do French student really bid sincerely?," Working Papers halshs-00277282, HAL.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Nicolas Jacquemet & Robert-Vincent Joule & Stéphane Luchini & Jason F. Shogren, 2009. "Preference Elicitation under Oath," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 09043, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
  2. Dominique Ami & Frédéric Aprahamian & Olivier Chanel & Stéphane Luchini, 2011. "A Test of Cheap Talk in Different Hypothetical Contexts: The Case of Air Pollution," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 50(1), pages 111-130, September.
  3. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00611696 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Nicolas Jacquemet & Robert-Vincent Joule & Stephane Luchini & Jason Shogren, 2013. "Preference Elicitation under Oath," Post-Print halshs-00731244, HAL.
  5. Samuel Ferey & Yannick Gabuthy & Nicolas Jacquemet, 2013. "L'apport de l'économie expérimentale dans l'élaboration des politiques publiques," Post-Print halshs-00879205, HAL.
  6. Nicolas Jacquemet & Alexander G. James & Stéphane Luchini & Jason F. Shogren, 2010. "Social psychology and environmental economics : a new look at ex ante corrections of biased preference evaluation," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 10016, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
  7. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00584247 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. Nicolas Jacquemet & Robert‐Vincent Joule & Stéphane Luchini & Jason F. Shogren, 2011. "Do People Always Pay Less Than They Say? Testbed Laboratory Experiments with IV and HG Values," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(5), pages 857-882, October.
  9. Nicolas Jacquemet & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2011. "What drives failure to maximize payoffs in the lab? A test of the inequality aversion hypothesis," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 11036, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
  10. Curtis R. Price & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2012. "Endowment Origin, Demographic Effects and Individual Preferences in Contests," Working Papers 12-07, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  11. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00462193 is not listed on IDEAS

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