Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Referenda under Oath

Contents:

Author Info

  • Nicolas Jacquemet

    ()
    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris)

  • Alexander James

    ()
    (University of Wyoming - Department of Economics and Finance)

  • Stephane Luchini

    ()
    (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - CNRS : UMR6579)

  • Jason Shogren

    ()
    (Departement Economy and Finance, University of Wyoming - University of Wyoming)

Abstract

Herein we explore whether a solemn oath can eliminate hypothetical bias in a voting referenda, a design commonly promoted in nonmarket valuation exercises for its incentive compatibility properties. First, we reject the null hypothesis that a hypothetical bias does not exist. Second, we cannot reject the hypothesis that people who sign an oath are as likely to vote for the public good (e.g., wind energy R&D) in a hypothetical referenda as in a real one. This result opens interesting avenues for improving the elicitation of preferences in the lab.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/49/04/48/PDF/DTGREQAM2010-15.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) with number halshs-00490448.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 08 Jun 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00490448

Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00490448
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/

Related research

Keywords: Dichotomous Choice Mechanism; Hypothetical bias; Oath; Preference revelation;

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. repec:hal:cesptp:halshs-00731244 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00635801 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Nicolas Jacquemet & Alexander G. James & Stéphane Luchini & Jason F. Shogren, 2010. "Social psychology and environmental economics : a new look at ex ante corrections of biased preference evaluation," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 10016, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
  4. Hermann Donfouet & Pierre-Alexandre Mahieu & Eric Malin, 2013. "Using respondents’ uncertainty scores to mitigate hypothetical bias in community-based health insurance studies," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 277-285, April.
  5. Carlsson, Fredrik & Kataria, Mitesh & Krupnick, Alan & Lampi, Elina & Löfgren, Åsa & Qin, Ping & Sterner, Thomas & Chung, Susie, 2010. "The Truth, the Whole Truth, and Nothing but the Truth - A Multiple Country Test of an Oath Script," Working Papers in Economics 473, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
  6. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00731244 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00584247 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. Nicolas Jacquemet & Stephane Luchini & Jason Shogren & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2011. "Coordination with Communication under Oath," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00635801, HAL.
  9. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00879205 is not listed on IDEAS
  10. Nobuyuki Hanaki & Nicolas Jacquemet & Stéphane Luchini & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2013. "Bounded Rationality and Strategic Uncertainty in a Simple Dominance Solvable Game," Economics Discussion / Working Papers 13-14, The University of Western Australia, Department of Economics.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00490448. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.