Referenda under Oath
Abstract
Herein we explore whether a solemn oath can eliminate hypothetical bias in a voting referenda, a design commonly promoted in nonmarket valuation exercises for its incentive compatibility properties. First, we reject the null hypothesis that a hypothetical bias does not exist. Second, we cannot reject the hypothesis that people who sign an oath are as likely to vote for the public good (e.g., wind energy R&D) in a hypothetical referenda as in a real one. This result opens interesting avenues for improving the elicitation of preferences in the lab.Download Info
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Paper provided by HAL in its series Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) with number halshs-00490448.Length:
Date of creation: 08 Jun 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00490448
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00490448
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Related research
Keywords: Dichotomous Choice Mechanism; Hypothetical bias; Oath; Preference revelation;This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-06-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2010-06-18 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-ENE-2010-06-18 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2010-06-18 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-POL-2010-06-18 (Positive Political Economics)
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- repec:hal:journl:halshs-00584247 is not listed on IDEAS
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Alexander James & Stéphane Luchini & Jason Shogren, 2011.
"Social Psychology and Environmental Economics: A New Look at ex ante Corrections of Biased Preference Evaluation,"
Environmental & Resource Economics,
European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 48(3), pages 413-433, March.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Alexander James & Stephane Luchini & Jason Shogren, 2010. "Social psychology and environmental economics : a new look at ex ante corrections of biased preference evaluation," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00462193, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Alexander James & Stephane Luchini & Jason Shogren, 2011. "Social psychology and environmental economics: a new look at ex ante corrections of biased preference evaluation," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00584247, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Alexander G. James & Stéphane Luchini & Jason F. Shogren, 2010. "Social psychology and environmental economics : a new look at ex ante corrections of biased preference evaluation," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 10016, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Carlsson, Fredrik & Kataria, Mitesh & Krupnick, Alan & Lampi, Elina & Löfgren, Åsa & Qin, Ping & Sterner, Thomas & Chung, Susie, 2010.
"The Truth, the Whole Truth, and Nothing but the Truth - A Multiple Country Test of an Oath Script,"
Working Papers in Economics
473, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
- Fredrik Carlsson & Mitesh Kataria & Alan Krupnick & Elina Lampi & Asa Löfgren & Ping Qin & Thomas Sterner & Susie Chung, 2010. "The Truth, the Whole Truth, and Nothing but the Truth A Multiple Country Test of an Oath Script," Jena Economic Research Papers 2010-076, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
- Hermann Pythagore Pierre Donfouet & Pierre-Alexandre Mahieu & Eric Malin, 2011. "Using Respondents’ Uncertainty Scores to Mitigate Hypothetical Bias in Community-Based Health Insurance Studies," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201129, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Robert-Vincent Joule & Stephane Luchini & Jason Shogren, 2009.
"Preference Elicitation under Oath,"
Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers)
halshs-00396721, HAL.
- Jacquemet, Nicolas & Joule, Robert-Vincent & Luchini, Stéphane & Shogren, Jason F., 2013. "Preference elicitation under oath," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 110-132.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Robert-Vincent Joule & Stéphane Luchini & Jason F. Shogren, 2009. "Preference Elicitation under Oath," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 09043, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Robert-Vincent Joule & Stephane Luchini & Jason Shogren, 2013. "Preference Elicitation under Oath," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00731244, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stephane Luchini & Jason Shogren & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2011. "Coordination with Communication under Oath," Working Papers halshs-00635801, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stephane Luchini & Jason Shogren & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2011. "Coordination with Communication under Oath," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00635801, HAL.
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