Do French student really bid sincerely?
AbstractDo French Students really bid sincerely in real and hypothetical incentive compatible auctions? Recent evidence suggests they do, which goes counter to most observed bidding behavior in theUnited States, and supports the idea that cultural differences may explain bidding behavior more than economic circumstances. Herein we run a robustness check by exploring bidding behavior in classic Vickrey auction for real and hypothetical values in the two largest cities (Paris and Lyon). Two striking results emerge–(1) French students bid sincerely; and (2) no hypothetical bias exists.
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Date of creation: 06 May 2008
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Auctions; Demand revelation; Experimental valuation; Hypothetical bias;
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- Nicolas Jacquemet & Robert-Vincent Joule & Stephane Luchini & Jason Shogren, 2009.
"Earned wealth, engaged bidders? Evidence from a second price auction,"
UniversitÃ© Paris1 PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers)
- Jacquemet, Nicolas & Joule, Robert-Vincent & Luchini, Stéphane & Shogren, Jason F., 2009. "Earned wealth, engaged bidders? Evidence from a second-price auction," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(1), pages 36-38, October.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stephane Luchini & Robert-Vincent Joule & Jason Shogren, 2008. "Earned Wealth, Engaged Bidders? Evidence from a second price auction," UniversitÃ© Paris1 PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00277283, HAL.
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