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When overconfident agents slow down collective learning

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  • Juliette Rouchier

    (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - CNRS : UMR6579)

  • Emily Tanimura

    (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - CNRS : UMR6579, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne)

Abstract

This paper presents a model of influence where agents' beliefs are based on an objective reality, such as the properties of an environment. The perception of the objective reality is not direct: all agents know is that the more correct a belief, the more successful the actions that are deduced from this belief. (A pair of agents can influence each other when )Agents can influence eachother by pair when they perform a joint action. They are not only defined by individual beliefs, but also idyosynchratic confidence in their belief - this means that they are not all willing to (engage in action with) act with agents with a different belief and to be influenced by them. We show here that the distribution of confidence in the group has a huge impact on the speed and quality of collective learning and in particular that a small number of overconfident agents can prevent the whole group frow learning properly.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) with number hal-00623966.

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Date of creation: Jan 2012
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Publication status: Published, SIMULATION, 2012, 88, 1, 33-49
Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00623966

Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal-paris1.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00623966
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Related research

Keywords: agent-based computational economics; belief dissemination; bounded-confidence; simulation agents; social influence;

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

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  1. repec:bla:restud:v:72:y:2005:i:2:p:287-312 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Bruno Biais & Denis Hilton & Karine Mazurier & Sébastien Pouget, 2005. "Judgemental Overconfidence, Self-Monitoring, and Trading Performance in an Experimental Financial Market," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 72(2), pages 287-312.
  3. Guillaume Deffuant & Frederic Amblard & G�rard Weisbuch, 2002. "How Can Extremism Prevail? a Study Based on the Relative Agreement Interaction Model," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 5(4), pages 1.
  4. Gilles Hilary & Lior Menzly, 2006. "Does Past Success Lead Analysts to Become Overconfident?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 52(4), pages 489-500, April.
  5. Katarzyna Sznajd-Weron & Jozef Sznajd, 2000. "Opinion evolution in closed community," HSC Research Reports HSC/00/04, Hugo Steinhaus Center, Wroclaw University of Technology.
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