Assessing The Truth Axiom Under Incomplete Information
AbstractWithin an incomplete information framework (where the primitives are the individuals' belief hierarchies) we investigate the intersubjective implications of the assumption that it is common belief that no individual has any false beliefs (a key component of the Truth Axiom). We consider two types of intersubjective conditions: (1) qualitative agreement and unbounded gains from betting, and (2) a notion of intersubjective caution. The entire analysis is carried out locally.
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- Bonanno, Giacomo & Nehring, Klaus, 1998. "Assessing the truth axiom under incomplete information," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 3-29, July.
- Klaus Nehring & Giacomo Bonanno, 2003. "Assessing The Truth Axiom Under Incomplete Information," Working Papers 973, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
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- Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring, .
"Intersubjective Consistency Of Knowledge And Belief,"
Department of Economics
98-03, California Davis - Department of Economics.
- Giacomo Bonanno, 2003. "Intersubjective Consistency Of Knowledge And Belief," Working Papers 983, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Klaus Nehring, 2003. "Common Priors For Like-Minded Agents," Economics Working Papers 0035, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
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- Giacomo Bonanno, 2014.
"Reasoning about strategies and rational play in dynamic games,"
149, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Giacomo Bonanno, 2011. "Reasoning about strategies and rational play in dynamic games," Working Papers 1111, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Samet, Dov, 2013. "Common belief of rationality in games of perfect information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 192-200.
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- Tarbush, Bassel, 2011. "Generalisation of Samet's (2010) agreement theorem," MPRA Paper 29067, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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