Epistemic Foundations Of Solution Concepts In Game Theory: An Introduction
AbstractWe give an introduction to the literature on the epistemic foundations of solution concepts in game theory. Only normal-form games are considered. The solution concepts analyzed are rationalizability, strong rationalizability, correlated equilibrium and Nash equilibrium. The analysis is carried out locally in terms of properties of the belief hierarchies. Several examples are used throughout to illustrate definitions and concepts.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by California Davis - Department of Economics in its series Department of Economics with number 97-21.
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Postal: University of California Davis - Department of Economics. One Shields Ave., California 95616-8578
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- Klaus Nehring & Giacomo Bonanno, 2003. "Epistemic Foundations Of Solution Concepts In Game Theory: An Introduction," Working Papers 9721, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
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