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A Normative Justification of Compulsory Education

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  • Alessandro Balestrino
  • Lisa Grazzini

    (Università degli Studi di Firenze)

  • Annalisa Luporini

    (Università degli Studi di Firenze)

Abstract

Using a household production model of educational choices, we characterise a free market situation in which some agents ("high-wagers") educate their children full-time and spend a sizable amount of resources on them, while others ("low-wagers") educate them only partially. The free-market equilibrium is inefficient and iniquitous. Public policy is thus called for: however, redistributive taxation alone is counter-productive, as it forces some agents to move away from full-time education for their kids, and educational price subsidies are only moderately effective, since they only work on the intensive margin. It is instead socially optimal to introduce a compulsory education package, using a redistributive tax system to finance it. Redistributive taxation and compulsory education are therefore best seen as complementary policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Alessandro Balestrino & Lisa Grazzini & Annalisa Luporini, 2013. "A Normative Justification of Compulsory Education," Working Papers - Economics wp2013_18.rdf, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
  • Handle: RePEc:frz:wpaper:wp2013_18.rdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Alessandro Balestrino & Lisa Grazzini & Annalisa Luporini, 2021. "On the political economy of compulsory education," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 134(1), pages 1-25, September.
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    3. Pertti Haaparanta & Ravi Kanbur & Tuuli Paukkeri & Jukka Pirttilä & Matti Tuomala, 2022. "Promoting education under distortionary taxation: equality of opportunity versus welfarism," The Journal of Economic Inequality, Springer;Society for the Study of Economic Inequality, vol. 20(2), pages 281-297, June.
    4. Tang, Le & Sun, Shiyu & Yang, Weiguo, 2021. "Investments in human capital: The evidence from China’s new rural pension scheme," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 55(C).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
    • H52 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Education

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