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Equality of Opportunity and Optimal Cash and In-Kind Policies

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Author Info
Leonardo Gasparini () (Centro de Estudios Distributivos, Laborales y Sociales (CEDLAS) - Universidad Nacional de La Plata)
Santiago Pinto () (Department of Economics, West Virginia University)

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Abstract

This paper examines the argument for public provision of certain private goods, like education and health, based on equality of opportunity by studying the utility possibility frontier of a society in which there is a concern for the distribution of these goods. A given quality of education or health services can be consumed for free in the public sector, but people can opt-out and purchase their desired quality levels in the private sector. Some of the conclusions are: (i) a pure cash transfer is optimal when the utility redistribution is either “sufficiently” small or large; (ii) if and only if both the equality-of-opportunity concern and the utility redistribution are large enough, can an in-kind program which attracts the whole population be justified; (iii) even when everybody chooses the in-kind program, it may be optimal to perform some additional utility redistribution by increasing the size of such program.

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File URL: http://www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/cedlas/pdfs/doc_cedlas22.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by CEDLAS, Universidad Nacional de La Plata in its series Working Papers with number 0022.

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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dls:wpaper:0022

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Related research
Keywords: equality of opportunity redistribution education in-kind

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D3 - Microeconomics - - Distribution
H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
I2 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard E, 1996. "Public Provision of Private Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(1), pages 57-84, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Gouveia, Miguel, 1997. " Majority Rule and the Public Provision of a Private Good," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 93(3-4), pages 221-44, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Ganderton, Philip T., 1992. "The effect of subsidies in kind on the choice of a college," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 269-292, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Bruce, Neil & Waldman, Michael, 1991. "Transfers in Kind: Why They Can Be Efficient and Nonpaternalistic," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1345-51, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Sandmo, Agnar, 1983. "Ex Post Welfare Economics and the Theory of Merit Goods," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 50(197), pages 19-33, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Tobin, James, 1970. "On Limiting the Domain of Inequality," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(2), pages 263-77, October.
  7. Archibald, G. C. & Donaldson, David, 1979. "Notes on economic equality," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 205-214, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Blomquist, Soren & Christiansen, Vidar, 1999. "The political economy of publicly provided private goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 31-54, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Blomquist, Soren & Christiansen, Vidar, 1998. "Topping Up or Opting Out? The Optimal Design of Public Provision Schemes," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 39(2), pages 399-411, May.
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  10. Coate, Stephen, 1995. "Altruism, the Samaritan's Dilemma, and Government Transfer Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 46-57, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Blackorby, Charles & Donaldson, David, 1988. "Cash versus Kind, Self-selection, and Efficient Transfers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 691-700, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Peltzman, Sam, 1973. "The Effect of Government Subsidies-in-Kind on Private Expenditures: The Case of Higher Education," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(1), pages 1-27, Jan.-Feb.. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Pinto, Santiago M., 2004. "Assistance to poor households when income is not observed: targeted in-kind and in-cash transfers," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 536-553, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1991. "Public Provision of Private Goods and the Redistribution of Income," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 979-84, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. James M. Poterba, 1995. "Government Intervention in the Markets for Education and Health Care: How and Why?," NBER Working Papers 4916, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Barr, Nicholas, 1992. "Economic Theory and the Welfare State: A Survey and Interpretation," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 30(2), pages 741-803, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Nichols, Albert L & Zeckhauser, Richard J, 1982. "Targeting Transfers through Restrictions on Recipients," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(2), pages 372-77, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Blomquist, Suren & Christiansen, Vidar, 1995. " Public Provision of Private Goods as a Redistributive Device in an Optimum Income Tax Model," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 97(4), pages 547-67, December.
  19. Gasparini, Leonardo C. & Pinto, Santiago M., 2006. "Equality of opportunity and optimal cash and in-kind policies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 143-169, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  20. Besley, Timothy, 1988. "A simple model for merit good arguments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 371-383, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Boadway, Robin & Marchand, Maurice, 1995. "The Use of Public Expenditures for Redistributive Purposes," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(1), pages 45-59, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Paula Giovagnoli, 2007. "Failures in school progression," Working Papers 0050, CEDLAS, Universidad Nacional de La Plata. [Downloadable!]
  2. Ricardo Bebczuk & Francisco Haimovich, 2007. "MDGs and Microcredit: An Empirical Evaluation for Latin American Countries," Working Papers 0048, CEDLAS, Universidad Nacional de La Plata. [Downloadable!]
  3. Sebastian Galiani & Federico, 2007. "Modeling Informality Formally: Households and Firms," Working Papers 0047, CEDLAS, Universidad Nacional de La Plata. [Downloadable!]
  4. Leopoldo Tornarolli & Adriana Conconi, 2007. "Informalidad y Movilidad Laboral: Un Análisis Empírico para Argentina," Working Papers 0059, CEDLAS, Universidad Nacional de La Plata. [Downloadable!]
  5. Leonardo Gasparini & Santiago Pinto, 2005. "Equality of Opportunity and Optimal Cash and In-Kind Policies," Working Papers 0022, CEDLAS, Universidad Nacional de La Plata. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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