Self--enforcing Intergenerational Transfers and the Provision of Education
AbstractThis paper considers intra--family financing of human capital under the assumptions that individuals are selfish and binding contracts are not feasible. Cooperation among family members is possible through a family norm (a family "social capital") which prescribes the obligations to be met at each stage in life and sanctions for those who deviate. We characterize the set of self--enforcing transfers and show that there is a downward bias in the family provision of education. This gives a rationale for public action as a remedy to the lack of commitment between selfish family members. Copyright The London School of Economics and Political Science 2003
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by London School of Economics and Political Science in its journal Economica.
Volume (Year): 70 (2003)
Issue (Month): 277 (February)
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Other versions of this item:
- Anderberg, Dan & Balestrino, Alessandro, 2001. "Self-Enforcing Intergenerational Transfers and the Provision of Education," CEPR Discussion Papers 3107, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- D91 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice - - - Intertemporal Household Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving
- H22 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Incidence
- I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
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