How to Deal with Covert Child Labour, and Give Children an Effective Education, in a Poor Developing Country
AbstractAs credit and insurance markets are imperfect, and given that intra-family transfers, and the way a child uses her time outside school hours, are private information, the second-best policy makes school enrollment compulsory, forces overt child labour below its efficient level (if positive), and uses a combination of need and merit based grants, financed by earmarked taxes, to relax credit constraints, redistribute and insure. Existing conditional cash transfer schemes can be made to approximate the second-best policy by incorporating these principles in some measure.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 5663.
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2011
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in: World Bank Economic Review, 2012, 26 (1), 61-67
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Other versions of this item:
- Alessandro Cigno, 2012. "How to Deal with Covert Child Labor and Give Children an Effective Education, in a Poor Developing Country," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 26(1), pages 61-77.
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
- I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
- J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-04-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2011-04-30 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-DEV-2011-04-30 (Development)
- NEP-LAB-2011-04-30 (Labour Economics)
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