The Desirability of In-Kind Transfers in the Presence of Distortionary Taxes
AbstractA standard argument in welfare economics maintains that private goods should not be publicly provided, because cash transfers are always superior to in-kind transfers. However, this conclusion does not hold in second best economies. A strong case for the desirability of in-kind transfer in the presence of distortionary taxes has been made in various recent contributions. Here, we survey the arguments provided in these papers, using a common theoretical framework which enables us to present more clearly the similarities and the differences among the various papers. The use of a common formal model helps us to show how the rationale for public provision of private goods is sensitive to the form of the tax system. It also helps us to provide an explanation why mandatory and non-mandatory in-kind transfer schemes have the same effects on social welfare. Finally, we offer some considerations on the relevance of the theory of in-kind transfers for policy action. Copyright 1999 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Economic Surveys.
Volume (Year): 13 (1999)
Issue (Month): 4 (September)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0950-0804
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Daniela Sonedda & Gilberto Turati, 2005. "Winners and Losers in the Italian Welfare State: A Microsimulation Analysis of Income Redistribution Considering In-Kind Transfers," Giornale degli Economisti, GDE (Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia), Bocconi University, vol. 64(4), pages 423-464, December.
- Anne Emblem, 2002. "Redistribution at the Hospital," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 367-378, August.
- Simona GRASSI, 2006. "On the characteristics of a mixed system of provision of a private good. An application to health care," Departmental Working Papers 2006-14, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
- Anderberg, Dan, 1999. "Determining the mix of public and private provision of insurance by majority rule," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 417-440, September.
- Luciano Greco, 2006.
"Optimal Redistribution With Productive Social Services,"
"Marco Fanno" Working Papers
0026, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
- Luciano G. Greco, 2011. "Optimal Redistribution with Productive Social Services," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 113(1), pages 55-73, 03.
- Callan, Tim & Keane, Claire, 2009.
"Non-Cash Benefits and the Distribution of Economic Welfare,"
IZA Discussion Papers
3954, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Tim Callan & Claire Keane, 2008. "Non-Cash Benefits and the Distribution of Economic Welfare," Papers WP245, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI).
- repec:eso:journl:v:40:y:2009:i:1:p:49-71 is not listed on IDEAS
- Zanola, Roberto, 2000. "Public goods versus publicly provided private goods in a two-class economy," POLIS Working Papers 12, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
- Joan Esteban & Laura Mayoral, 2013. "A Politico-Economic Model of Public Expenditure and Income Taxation," Working Papers 743, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Balestrino, Alessandro, 1999. " User Charges as Redistributive Devices," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 1(4), pages 511-24.
- Alessandro Balestrino, 2000. "Mixed Tax Systems and the Public Provision of Private Goods," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 7(4), pages 463-478, August.
- Zohal Hessami & Claudio Thum & Silke Uebelmesser, 2012. "A Political Economy Explanation for In-kind Redistribution: The Interplay of Corruption and Democracy," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2012-25, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.