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Multiple but Asymmetric Bank Financing: The Case of Relationship Lending

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  • Ralf Elsas

    ()

  • Frank Heinemann
  • Marcel Tyrell

Abstract

Empirical evidence suggests that even those firms presumably most in need of monitoring-intensive financing (young, small, and innovative firms) have a multitude of bank lenders, where one may be special in the sense of relationship lending. However, theory does not tell us a lot about the economic rationale for relationship lending in the context of multiple bank financing.To fill this gap, we analyze the optimal debt structure in a model that allows for multiple but asymmetric bank financing. The optimal debt structure balances the risk of lender coordination failure from multiple lending and the bargaining power of a pivotal relationship bank. We show that firms with low expected cash-flows or low interim liquidation values of assets prefer asymmetric financing, while firms with high expected cash-flow or high interim liquidation values of assets tend to finance without a relationship bank.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt am Main in its series Working Paper Series: Finance and Accounting with number 141.

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Date of creation: Nov 2004
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Handle: RePEc:fra:franaf:141

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  1. Carlsson, Hans & van Damme, Eric, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 989-1018, September.
  2. Gorton, Gary & Kahn, James, 2000. "The Design of Bank Loan Contracts," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 13(2), pages 331-64.
  3. Petersen, Mitchell A & Rajan, Raghuram G, 1994. " The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(1), pages 3-37, March.
  4. Oliver Hart, 2001. "Financial Contracting," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1924, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
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  6. Giancarlo Corsetti & Amil Dasgupta & Stephen Morris & Shin, Hyun, 2000. "Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1273, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  7. Elsas, Ralf & Krahnen, Jan Pieter, 1998. "Is relationship lending special? Evidence from credit-file data in Germany," CFS Working Paper Series 1998/05, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
  8. Ongena, Steven & Smith, David C., 2000. "What Determines the Number of Bank Relationships? Cross-Country Evidence," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 26-56, January.
  9. Hyun Shin, 2001. "Coordination Risk and the Price of Debt," Economics Series Working Papers 1999-W25, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  10. Frank Heinemann, 2002. "Exchange-rate Attack as a Coordination Game: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 18(4), pages 462-478.
  11. Franz Hubert & Dorothea Schäfer, 2002. "Coordination Failure with Multiple-Source Lending, the Cost of Protection Against a Powerful Lender," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 158(2), pages 256-, June.
  12. Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song, 2004. "Coordination risk and the price of debt," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 133-153, February.
  13. Mayer, Colin, 1987. "New Issues in Corporate Finance," CEPR Discussion Papers 181, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  14. Harhoff, Dietmar & Korting, Timm, 1998. "Lending relationships in Germany - Empirical evidence from survey data," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(10-11), pages 1317-1353, October.
  15. Enrica Detragiache & Paolo Garella & Luigi Guiso, 2000. "Multiple versus Single Banking Relationships: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(3), pages 1133-1161, 06.
  16. Berger, Allen N & Udell, Gregory F, 1995. "Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in Small Firm Finance," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 68(3), pages 351-81, July.
  17. Hans Degryse & Partick Van cayseele, 1998. "Relationship Lending within a Bank-based System: Evidence from European Small Business Data," Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers ces9816, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën.
  18. Boot, Arnoud W. A., 2000. "Relationship Banking: What Do We Know?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 7-25, January.
  19. Giancarlo Corsetti & Amil Dasgupta & Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2001. "Does one Soros make a difference?: a theory of currency crises with large and small traders," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 25045, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Michael Koetter & Thorsten Nestmann & Stéphanie Stolz & Michael Wedow, 2004. "Structures and Trends in German Banking," Kiel Working Papers 1225, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  2. Eirik Gaard Kristiansen, 2005. "Strategic bank monitoring and firms’ debt structure," Working Paper 2005/10, Norges Bank.
  3. Barone, Guglielmo & Felici, Roberto & Pagnini, Marcello, 2011. "Switching costs in local credit markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 694-704.
  4. Berger, Allen N. & Klapper, Leora F. & Martinez Peria, Maria Soledad & Zaidi, Rida, 2006. "Bank ownership type and banking relationships," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3862, The World Bank.
  5. Ongena, Steven & Tümer-Alkan, Günseli & Westernhagen, Natalja v., 2012. "Creditor concentration: An empirical investigation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(4), pages 830-847.
  6. Christophe J. Godlewski & Ydriss Ziane, 2008. "How many banks does it take to lend? Empirical evidence from Europe," Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center 2008-11, Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg.
  7. Doris Neuberger & Solvig Räthke, 2009. "Microenterprises and multiple bank relationships: The case of professionals," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 207-229, February.
  8. Giannetti, Caterina, 2012. "Relationship lending and firm innovativeness," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 762-781.
  9. Luigi Guiso & Raoul Minetti, 2007. "The Structure of Multiple Credit Relationships: Evidence from US Firms," Economics Working Papers ECO2007/46, European University Institute.
  10. Degryse, Hans & Ongena, Steven, 2007. "The impact of competition on bank orientation," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 399-424, July.
  11. Doris Neuberger, 2005. "What’s Common to Relationship Banking and Relationship Investing? Reflections within the Contractual Theory of the Firm," Finance 0503001, EconWPA.
  12. Christina Bannier, 2007. "Heterogeneous multiple bank financing: does it reduce inefficient credit-renegotiation incidences?," Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, Springer, vol. 21(4), pages 445-470, December.
  13. Doris Neuberger & Maurice Pedergnana & Solvig Räthke-Döppner, 2008. "Concentration of Banking Relationships in Switzerland: The Result of Firm Structure or Banking Market Structure?," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 33(2), pages 101-126, April.
  14. Neuberger, Doris & Räthke, Solvig, 2006. "Microenterprises and multiple bank relationships: Evidence from a survey among professionals," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 61, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics.

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