Red ink in the rearview mirror: local fiscal conditions and the issuance of traffic tickets
AbstractMunicipalities have revenue motives for enforcing traffic laws in addition to public safety motives because many traffic offenses are punished via fines and the issuing municipality often retains the revenue. Anecdotal evidence supports this revenue motive. We empirically test this revenue motive using panel data on North Carolina counties. We find that significantly more tickets are issued in the year following a decline in revenue, but the issuance of traffic tickets does not decline in years following revenue increases. Our results suggest that tickets are used as a revenue generation tool rather than solely a means to increase public safety. ; Formerly titled: Are traffic tickets countercyclical?
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis in its series Working Papers with number 2006-048.
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Thomas A. Garrett & Gary A. Wagner, 2009. "Red Ink in the Rearview Mirror: Local Fiscal Conditions and the Issuance of Traffic Tickets," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(1), pages 71-90, 02.
- NEP-ALL-2006-09-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-GEO-2006-09-16 (Economic Geography)
- NEP-PBE-2006-09-16 (Public Economics)
- NEP-URE-2006-09-16 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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