Alternative central bank credit policies for liquidity provision in a model of payments
AbstractI explore alternative central bank policies for liquidity provision in a model of payments. I use a mechanism design approach so that agents' incentives to default are explicit and contingent on the credit policy designed. In the first policy, the central bank invests in costly enforcement and charges an interest rate to recover costs. I show that the second best solution is not distortionary. In the second policy, the central bank requires collateral. If collateral does not bear an opportunity cost, then the solution is first best. Otherwise, the second best is distortionary because collateral serves as a binding credit constraint.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) in its series Finance and Economics Discussion Series with number 2005-55.
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Mills, David Jr., 2006. "Alternative central bank credit policies for liquidity provision in a model of payments," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(7), pages 1593-1611, October.
- David C. Mills, 2004. "Alternative Central Bank Credit Policies for Liquidity Provision in a Model of Payments," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 155, Econometric Society.
- E51 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-01-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2006-01-01 (Central Banking)
- NEP-FMK-2006-01-01 (Financial Markets)
- NEP-MAC-2006-01-01 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-MON-2006-01-01 (Monetary Economics)
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