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Repo markets, counterparty risk and the 2007/2008 liquidity crisis

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Listed:
  • Ewerhart, Christian
  • Tapking, Jens

Abstract

A standard repurchase agreement between two counterparties is considered to examine the endogenous choice of collateral assets, the feasibility of secured lending, and welfare implications of the central bank's collateral framework. As an important innovation, we allow for two-sided counterparty risk. Our findings relate to empirical characteristics of repo transactions and have an immediate bearing on market developments since August 2007. JEL Classification: G21, G32, E51

Suggested Citation

  • Ewerhart, Christian & Tapking, Jens, 2008. "Repo markets, counterparty risk and the 2007/2008 liquidity crisis," Working Paper Series 909, European Central Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:2008909
    Note: 428113
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    File URL: https://www.ecb.europa.eu//pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp909.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Susanu, Monica & Micu, Adrian & Micu, Angela Eliza, 2009. "Impact of the Financial Turmoil on the Romanian Capital Market," MPRA Paper 20481, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Nyborg, Kjell G., 2017. "Reprint of: Central bank collateral frameworks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 232-248.
    3. Paolo Fegatelli, 2010. "The role of collateral requirements in the crisis: one tool for two objectives?," BCL working papers 44, Central Bank of Luxembourg.
    4. Bindseil, Ulrich & Corsi, Marco & Sahel, Benjamin & Visser, Ad, 2017. "The Eurosystem collateral framework explained," Occasional Paper Series 189, European Central Bank.
    5. Bindseil, Ulrich & Jabłecki, Juliusz, 2013. "Central bank liquidity provision, risk-taking and economic efficiency," Working Paper Series 1542, European Central Bank.
    6. Ansgar Belke, 2010. "How Much Fiscal Backing Must the ECB Have? – The Euro Area is not the Philippines," Ruhr Economic Papers 0184, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
    7. Belke, Ansgar, 2010. "How Much Fiscal Backing Must the ECB Have? – The Euro Area is not the Philippines," Ruhr Economic Papers 184, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    8. Nuno Cassola & Ali Hortaçsu & Jakub Kastl, 2013. "The 2007 Subprime Market Crisis Through the Lens of European Central Bank Auctions for Short‐Term Funds," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(4), pages 1309-1345, July.
    9. Cyril Monnet & Borghan N. Narajabad, 2017. "Why Rent When You Can Buy?," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2017-094, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    10. Nyborg, Kjell G., 2017. "Central bank collateral frameworks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 198-214.
    11. Lucas Marc Fuhrer & Basil Guggenheim & Silvio Schumacher, 2016. "Re‐Use of Collateral in the Repo Market," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(6), pages 1169-1193, September.
    12. repec:zbw:rwirep:0184 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Falko Fecht & Kjell G. Nyborg & Jörg Rocholl & Jiri Woschitz, 2016. "Collateral, Central Bank Repos, and Systemic Arbitrage," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 16-66, Swiss Finance Institute.
    14. Jakob Korbinian Eberl, 2016. "The Collateral Framework of the Eurosystem and Its Fiscal Implications," ifo Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 69.
    15. repec:cii:cepiei:2010-4ta is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Avadanei Andreea, "undated". "The Implications Of Economic And Monetary Union In Sustaining European Money Market Integration," Description: Managerial Challenges of the Contemporary Society 1, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Babes-Bolyai University.
    17. Darrell Duffie, 2010. "The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 24(1), pages 51-72, Winter.
    18. Cyril Durand & Marek Rutkowski, 2013. "CVA for Bilateral Counterparty Risk under Alternative Settlement Conventions," Papers 1307.6486, arXiv.org.
    19. Gieck, Jana & Traczyk, Adam, 2013. "Unconventional Monetary Policy and bank supervision," MPRA Paper 62014, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    20. Infante, Sebastian, 2019. "Liquidity windfalls: The consequences of repo rehypothecation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 42-63.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    collateral; counterparty risk; haircuts.; liquidity; repurchase agreements;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • E51 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers

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