Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

The Role of Loan Guarantee Schemes in Alleviating Credit Rationing in the UK

Contents:

Author Info

  • Cowling, Marc

Abstract

It is a widely held perception, although empirically contentious, that credit rationing is an important phenomenon in the UK small business sector. In response to this perception the UK government initiated a loan guarantee scheme (SFLGS) in 1981. In this paper we use a unique dataset comprised of small firms facing a very real, and binding, credit constraint, to question whether a corrective scheme such as the SFLGS has, in practice, alleviated such constraints by promoting access to debt finance for small credit constrained firms. The results broadly support the view that the SFLGS has fulfilled its primary objective.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1613/
File Function: original version
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 1613.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 30 Jan 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:1613

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: credit rationing; small firms; entrepreneurship; debt finance;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Berger, Allen N & Udell, Gregory F, 1992. "Some Evidence on the Empirical Significance of Credit Rationing," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(5), pages 1047-77, October.
  2. Marc Cowling, 1999. "The determination of bank-small business loan premia in the UK," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 6(4), pages 251-253.
  3. Bester, Helmut, 1985. "Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 850-55, September.
  4. George Sofianos & Arie Melnik & Paul Wachtel, 1991. "Loan Commitments and Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 2232, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Robert Cressy & Otto Toivanen, 2001. "Is there adverse selection in the credit market?," Venture Capital, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 3(3), pages 215-238, July.
  6. Slovin, Myron B & Sushka, Marie Elizabeth, 1983. " A Model of the Commercial Loan Rate," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 38(5), pages 1583-96, December.
  7. de Meza, David & Southey, Clive, 1996. "The Borrower's Curse: Optimism, Finance and Entrepreneurship," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(435), pages 375-86, March.
  8. Beck, Thorsten & Demirguc-Kunt, Asli, 2006. "Small and medium-size enterprises: Access to finance as a growth constraint," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(11), pages 2931-2943, November.
  9. King, Stephen R, 1986. "Monetary Transmission: Through Bank Loans or Bank Liabilities?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 18(3), pages 290-303, August.
  10. Dionne, G. & Lasserre, P., 1984. "Adverse Selection, Repeated Insurance Contracts and Announcement Strategy," Cahiers de recherche 8445, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  11. Blanchflower, David G & Oswald, Andrew J, 1998. "What Makes an Entrepreneur?," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 26-60, January.
  12. Leeth, John D. & Scott, Jonathan A., 1989. "The Incidence of Secured Debt: Evidence from the Small Business Community," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 24(03), pages 379-394, September.
  13. Gaston Gelos & Alejandro M. Werner, 1999. "Financial Liberalization, Credit Constraints, and Collateral - Investment in the Mexican Manufacturing Sector," IMF Working Papers 99/25, International Monetary Fund.
  14. Petersen, Mitchell A & Rajan, Raghuram G, 1994. " The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(1), pages 3-37, March.
  15. Lindh, Thomas & Ohlsson, Henry, 1996. "Self-Employment and Windfall Gains: Evidence from the Swedish Lottery," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(439), pages 1515-26, November.
  16. Shen, Chung-Hua, 2002. "Credit Rationing for Bad Companies in Bad Years: Evidence from Bank Loan Transaction Data," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 7(3), pages 261-78, July.
  17. Marc Cowling, 1999. "The incidence of loan collateralization in small business lending contracts: evidence from the UK," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 6(5), pages 291-293.
  18. Yuk-Shee Chan & Anjan V. Thakor, 2004. "Collateral and Competitive Equilibria with Moral Hazard and Private Information," Finance 0411019, EconWPA.
  19. Douglas Holtz-Eakin & David Joulfaian & Harvey S. Rosen, 1993. "Sticking it Out: Entrepreneurial Survival and Liquidity Constraints," NBER Working Papers 4494, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  20. Inessa Love, 2003. "Financial Development and Financing Constraints: International Evidence from the Structural Investment Model," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 16(3), pages 765-791, July.
  21. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Giorgio Calcagnini & Fabio Farabullini & Germana Giombini, 2012. "The impact of the recent financial crisis on bank loan interest rates and guarantees," Working Papers 1202, University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Department of Economics, Society & Politics - Scientific Committee - L. Stefanini & G. Travaglini, revised 2012.
  2. Uesugi, Iichiro & Sakai, Koji & Yamashiro, Guy M., 2010. "The Effectiveness of Public Credit Guarantees in the Japanese Loan Market," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 457-480, December.
  3. Busetta, Giovanni & Zazzaro, Alberto, 2012. "Mutual loan-guarantee societies in monopolistic credit markets with adverse selection," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 15-24.
  4. Ippei Fujiwara & Yuki Teranishi, 2008. "Real Exchange Rate Dynamics under Staggered Loan Contracts," IMES Discussion Paper Series 08-E-11, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan.
  5. Karel Janda, 2011. "Credit Guarantees and Subsidies when Lender has a Market Power," Working Papers IES 2011/18, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Jun 2011.
  6. Yuki Teranishi, 2008. "Optimal Monetary Policy under Staggered Loan Contracts," IMES Discussion Paper Series 08-E-08, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan.
  7. Ono, Arito & Uesugi, Iichiro & Yasuda, Yukihiro, 2013. "Are lending relationships beneficial or harmful for public credit guarantees? Evidence from Japan's Emergency Credit Guarantee Program," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 151-167.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:1613. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.