Institutional Designs to Alleviate Liquidity Shortages in a Two- Country Model
AbstractFujiki (2003, 2006) extended the Freeman (1996) model to a two- country model, demonstrating that elastic money supplies in foreign exchange markets and the domestic credit market yield efficiency gains in monetary equilibrium, and that several institutional designs equally achieve the desired elastic money supplies. The present paper considers four institutional designs using a model similar to Fujiki (2003): a combination of central bank discount window policy and the CLS Bank; a central bank intervention both in the domestic credit market and the foreign exchange market; cross-border collateral arrangements; and foreign currency liquidity swap lines. These institutional designs yield the same efficiency gains in our model.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan in its series IMES Discussion Paper Series with number 13-E-07.
Date of creation: Aug 2013
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Foreign exchange market; CLS; Cross-border collateral arrangements; Liquidity swap lines;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- F31 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Exchange
- F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-09-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-MAC-2013-09-06 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-MON-2013-09-06 (Monetary Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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