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Mechanism Design and the Role of Enforcement in Freeman's Model of Payments

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Author Info
David C. Mills, Jr (Board of Governors)

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Abstract

Freeman (1996a) is the first to formulate a model in which (i) debts are repaid with money and (ii) there can arise liquidity problems which give rise to a role for a central bank discount window. I ask whether this payment system is truly essential in his model. It is not because there is another mechanism - one which features (i) and (ii) - that works well. This is because of a strong assumption regarding the enforcement of debt contracts. I then present a slightly different model of enforcement based on collateralized lending where (i) is necessary, but (ii) is not. (Copyright: Elsevier)

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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1094-2025(03)00045-0
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Article provided by Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics in its journal Review of Economic Dynamics.

Volume (Year): 7 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (january)
Pages: 219-236
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Handle: RePEc:red:issued:v:7:y:2004:i:1:p:219-236

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Related research
Keywords: Payments system discount window

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
E40 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - General
E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Ruilin Zhou, 2000. "Understanding intraday credit in large-value payment systems," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Q III, pages 29-44. [Downloadable!]
  2. Huggett, Mark & Krasa, Stefan, 1996. "Money and Storage in a Differential Information Economy," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 191-210, August.
  3. Mark Huggett & Stefan Krasa, 1996. "Money and storage in a differential information economy (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 191-209.
  4. Freeman, Scott, 1999. "Rediscounting under aggregate risk," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 197-216, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Edward J. Green, 1996. "Money and Debt in the Structure of Payments," Macroeconomics 9609002, EconWPA, revised 09 Sep 1996. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Joydeep Bhattacharya & Joseph H. Haslag & Antoine Martin, 2007. "Why does overnight liquidity cost more than intraday liquidity?," Staff Reports 281, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. James T. E. Chapman & Antoine Martin, 2007. "Rediscounting under aggregate risk with moral hazard," Staff Reports 296, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Antoine Martin & James McAndrews, 2008. "Should there be intraday money markets?," Staff Reports 337, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
  4. Jonathan Chiu & Alexandra Lai, 2007. "Modelling Payments Systems: A Review of the Literature," Working Papers 07-28, Bank of Canada. [Downloadable!]
  5. David C. Mills, Jr., 2005. "Alternative central bank credit policies for liquidity provision in a model of payments," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2005-55, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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This page was last updated on 2008-10-2.

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