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The Future of Securities Regulation

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  • Luigi Zingales

    (University of Chicago, NBER & CEPR)

Abstract

The U.S. system of security law was designed more than 70 years ago to regain investors’ trust after a major financial crisis. Today we face a similar problem. But while in the 1930s the prevailing perception was that investors had been defrauded by offerings of dubious quality securities, in the new millennium, investors’ perception is that they have been defrauded by managers who are not accountable to anyone. For this reason, I propose a series of reforms that center around corporate governance, while shifting the focus from the protection of unsophisticated investors in the purchasing of new securities issues to the investment in mutual funds, pension funds, and other forms of asset management.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2009.7.

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Date of creation: Jan 2009
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Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2009.7

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Keywords: U.S. Security Law; Securities Regulation; Trust;

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Dimitrova-Grajzl, Valentina & Grajzl, Peter & Guse, A. Joseph, 2012. "Trust, perceptions of corruption, and demand for regulation: Evidence from post-socialist countries," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 292-303.
  2. Hornuf, Lars & Schwienbacher, Armin, 2014. "Which Securities Regulation Promotes Crowdinvesting?," Discussion Papers in Economics 20975, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  3. Augustin Landier & David Thesmar, 2011. "Regulating Systemic Risk through Transparency: Trade-Offs in Making Data Public," NBER Chapters, in: Risk Topography: Systemic Risk and Macro Modeling, pages 31-44 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Carsten Burhop & David Chambers & Brian Cheffins, 2011. "Is Regulation Essential to Stock Market Development? Going Public in London and Berlin, 1900-1913," Cologne Economic History papers 10, University of Cologne, Department of Economic and Business History, revised Mar 2011.
  5. Carsten Burhop & Thorsten Luebbers, 2011. "The design of licensing contracts: Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals, and Electrical Engineering in Imperial Germany," Cologne Economic History papers 11, University of Cologne, Department of Economic and Business History, revised Jun 2011.
  6. Ekkayokkaya, Manapol & Pengniti, Tulaya, 2012. "Governance reform and IPO underpricing," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 238-253.

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