Innovation and Institutional Ownership
AbstractWe find that institutional ownership in publicly traded companies is associated with more innovation (measured by cite-weighted patents). To explore the mechanism through which this link arises, we build a model that nests the lazy-manager hypothesis with career-concerns, where institutional owners increase managerial incentives to innovate by reducing the career risk of risky projects. The data supports the career concerns model. First, whereas the lazy manager hypothesis predicts a substitution effect between institutional ownership and product market competition (and managerial entrenchment generally), the career-concern model allows for complementarity. Empirically, we reject substitution effects. Second, CEOs are less likely to be fired in the face of profit downturns when institutional ownership is higher. Finally, using instrumental variables, policy changes and disaggregating by type of owner we find that the effect of institutions on innovation does not appear to be due to endogenous selection.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre for Economic Performance, LSE in its series CEP Discussion Papers with number dp0911.
Date of creation: Feb 2009
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Web page: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/publications/series.asp?prog=CEP
Innovation; institutional ownership; career concerns; R&D; productivity;
Other versions of this item:
- Zingales, Luigi & Reenen, John Van & Aghion, Philippe, 2009. "Innovation and Institutional Ownership," Scholarly Articles 4481491, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Philippe Aghion & John Van Reenen & Luigi Zingales, 2010. "Innovation and Institutional Ownership," Working Papers 2010.99, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Philippe Aghion & John Van Reenen & Luigi Zingales, 2009. "Innovation and Institutional Ownership," NBER Working Papers 14769, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Aghion, Philippe & Van Reenen, John & Zingales, Luigi, 2009. "Innovation and Institutional Ownership," CEPR Discussion Papers 7195, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Philippe Aghion & John Van Reenen & Luigi Zingales, 2009. "Innovation and institutional ownership," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 25480, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
- O32 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
- O33 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes
- G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-02-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2009-02-14 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2009-02-14 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-INO-2009-02-14 (Innovation)
- NEP-IPR-2009-02-14 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-MIC-2009-02-14 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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