Forcing Firms to Talk: Financial Disclosure Regulation and Externalities
AbstractWe analyze a model of voluntary disclosure by firms and the desirability of disclosure regulation. In our model disclosure is costly, it has private and social value, and its precision is endogenous. We show that (i) a convexity in the value of disclosure can lead to a discontinuity in the disclosure policy; (ii) the Nash equilibrium of a voluntary disclosure game is often socially inefficient; (iii) regulation that requires a minimal precision level sometimes but not always improves welfare; (iii) the same is true for subsidies that change the perceived cost of disclosures; and (iv) neither regulation method dominates the other. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Society for Financial Studies in its journal Review of Financial Studies.
Volume (Year): 13 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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Postal: Oxford University Press, Journals Department, 2001 Evans Road, Cary, NC 27513 USA.
Web page: http://www.rfs.oupjournals.org/
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