The Political Economy of the Securities Act of 1933
AbstractThe Securities Act of 1933 is typically described as a "full disclosure" statute, yet many of its detailed provisions forbid disclosure about pending offerings during specified periods or using specified media. These features provided governmental enforcement of retail selling restrictions that are widely used by managing underwriters but that became difficult to enforce contractually during the late 1920s. The net effect was to reduce competition among investment banks. In particular, the act protected separate wholesale and retail investment banks from competition by integrated firms. Copyright 2001 by the University of Chicago.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Legal Studies.
Volume (Year): 30 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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- Harold Mulherin, J., 2007. "Measuring the costs and benefits of regulation: Conceptual issues in securities markets," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(2-3), pages 421-437, June.
- Zingales, Luigi, 2009.
"The Future of Securities Regulation,"
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7110, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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